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The wave of upbeat stories on the developing world’s emerging middle class has reinvigorated a debate
on how social class in general and the middle class in particular ought to be defined and measured. In the
economics literature, most scholars agree that being middle class entails being free from poverty, which
means being able to afford the basic things in life – not only today, but also tomorrow. In consequence,
there is an increasing tendency to define the middle class based on a lack of vulnerability to poverty. In
this paper, we strengthen and expand on these existing approaches in three ways: First, we incorporate
the differentiation between the middle class and a (non-poor) vulnerable group into a broader
social-stratification schema that additionally differentiates between transient and chronic poverty.
Second, in estimating the risk of poverty, we employ a multivariate regression model that explicitly
allows for possible feedback effects from past poverty experiences and accounts for the potential endo-
geneity of initial conditions, unobserved heterogeneity, and non-random panel attrition – four factors
insufficiently addressed in existing studies. Third, we highlight the value of paying attention to these con-
ceptual and modelling issues by showing that class divisions based on monetary thresholds inadequately
capture a household’s chances of upward and downward mobility. We then apply our conceptual frame-
work to the South African case. We find that only one in four South Africans can be considered stably
middle class or elite. Access to stable labor market income is a key determinant of achieving economic
stability. A lack of jobs as well as the prevalence of precarious forms of work drive high levels of vulner-
ability, which in turn constrains the development of an emergent middle class – not only in South Africa
but potentially also in other parts of the developing world that face similar labor market challenges.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
What defines the middle class? While countless interpretations
appear to exist, most definitions of what constitutes the middle
class relate in some way to the degree of economic security and
self-sufficiency that people experience. Correspondingly, it is their
confidence in their economic stability which many people name
first when asked what makes them self-identify as middle class
(see Phadi & Ceruti, 2011). They also cite the opportunities they
are given to move ahead in life, which some people never get,
and the financial cushion that allows them to take risks and cope
with adverse shocks.In spite of this notion, more than a few studies in the economics
literature locate the middle class just above the poverty line (for an
extensive review of different approaches, see Zizzamia, Schotte,
Leibbrandt, & Ranchhod, 2016). These studies, however, fail to
acknowledge that being able to afford a certain basket of goods
at a given point in time provides an insufficient indication of
whether the same will be true in the near future, and that some
of those who are currently non-poor may face a non-negligible risk
of falling into poverty. Moreover, most of these studies are blind to
the fact that not all households below the poverty line are alike.
Poverty tends to be self-perpetuating, but while some households
may have always been poor, others may have suffered some nega-
tive financial shock that either temporarily or permanently pushed
them into poverty (see, inter alia, Dercon, 2006; Glewwe & Gibson,
2005; Klasen & Povel, 2013). Taking on this dynamic perspective,
we aim in this study to incorporate the unequal distribution of
1 The income range of the middle class identified by Zizzamia et al. (2016) overlaps
with another recent attempt at defining the middle class in South Africa based on
occupation-based affluence criteria (compare Visagie & Posel, 2013).
S. Schotte et al. /World Development 110 (2018) 88–103 89poverty risks into a coherent framework of social stratification that
accounts for both current living standards and mobility patterns.
Accordingly, we link the demarcation of social strata to an in-
depth analysis of poverty transitions. In doing so, we aim to bridge
the gap between the poverty dynamics literature and the middle
class literature in economics, which – in our understanding –
should not be treated in isolation. Our contribution is therefore
both conceptual and empirical: The conceptual contribution consists
of the proposal of a multilayered schema of social stratification
with particular relevance for contexts marked by high inequality
paired with high socioeconomic risks, as in many low- and
middle-income countries. While the idea of defining the middle
class using a vulnerability criterion is not novel (see López-Calva
& Ortiz-Juarez, 2014), we aim to strengthen and broaden the scope
of existing approaches in the economics literature in three ways:
First, our approach provides a thorough link between the poverty
dynamics and the middle class literatures. To our knowledge, this
paper is the first to incorporate the differentiation between the
middle class and a non-poor but vulnerable group into a social-
stratification schema that additionally differentiates between tran-
sient and chronic poverty. Second, we argue that the simple mod-
eling framework used by existing studies to derive a
vulnerability index that identifies the middle class lacks robust-
ness, as it ignores several important findings from the poverty
dynamics literature. Following Cappellari and Jenkins (2002,
2004, 2008), we employ a multivariate regression model that
explicitly allows for possible feedback effects from past poverty
experiences and accounts for the potential endogeneity of initial
conditions, unobserved heterogeneity, and non-random panel
attrition – four factors insufficiently addressed in existing studies
when estimating poverty risks. Third, we show that traditional
social stratification variables (such as education and occupation)
and demographic characteristics (such as race, gender, and house-
hold composition) are important predictors of poverty risks, which
cannot be fully captured by current income or consumption levels
alone. Therefore, we refrain from the definition of absolute mone-
tary thresholds to identify class layers and instead base our analy-
sis directly on estimated risk cut-offs.
The empirical contribution consists of the application of the pro-
posed conceptual framework to the South African case. The multi-
variate model of poverty transitions is fitted to four waves of panel
data from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) covering
the period from 2008 to 2014/15. Four key findings emerge from
this analysis: First, only one in four South Africans can be consid-
ered stably middle class or elite. This share is considerably smaller
than the range of 30 to 55 percent that other studies suggest
(Burger, McAravey, & Van der Berg, 2017; Burger, Steenekamp,
van der Berg, & Zoch, 2015; Visagie & Posel, 2013). Second, poverty
in South Africa exhibits substantial genuine state dependence. That
is, the experience of poverty itself, independent of other household
characteristics and resources, leads to a higher risk of future pov-
erty. Third, a higher level of education on the part of the household
head and access to stable labor market income are key determi-
nants for achieving economic stability in South Africa, while casual
and precarious forms of work do little to reduce poverty risks.
Fourth, there are two strata – the temporarily poor and the vulner-
able – which are characterized by comparatively high volatility and
frequent movements into and out of poverty. These two relatively
similar groups are clearly distinguishable from both the chronic
poor and the stable middle class and elite – not only in terms of
their household characteristics, but also likely in terms of their pol-
icy needs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2
we develop our schema of social stratification in relation to the
existing literature. The empirical application of the conceptual
framework to the South African case is provided in Section 3. Onthis basis, Section 4 profiles the five social classes identified for
the South African case in terms of their relative size, growth, racial
composition and other demographic characteristics, geographic
location, labor market resources, and mobility patterns. Section 5
summarizes and concludes.2. A Multilayered schema of social stratification
In this section, we propose a social-stratification schema that
aims to capture the existence of structured inequalities both in
present living standards and in the distribution of opportunities
to sustain a living above the subsistence level in the medium term.
The proposed schema is anchored in the definition of an absolute
poverty threshold designed to represent the cost of satisfying basic
consumption needs. As such, it is tailored to low- and middle-
income countries rather than high-income countries, where
relative-poverty concepts dominate. Its relevance is highest in con-
texts marked by systematized and enduring (or even rising) socioe-
conomic inequality – including an unequal distribution of risks and
access to coping mechanisms as well as of opportunities for
upward mobility. It can be applied to economies experiencing fast
growth spurts that are not sustained, with the consequence that
those rising out of poverty may remain vulnerable to falling back,
as well as to countries experiencing slow growth that occurs in a
context marked by significant churning around the poverty line.2.1. Conceptual foundations
In the economic literature, class analyses commonly draw on a
monetary indicator to approximate a person’s social status. Most
commonly used are absolute thresholds that (often arbitrarily)
locate the middle class within a particular income or expenditure
range, which eases comparisons across countries. It is clear that
the way in which these thresholds are set can have qualitatively
different implications, and in particular the lower cut-off point
separating the poor from the middle class has been heatedly
debated in the literature (for a detailed discussion, see Giesbert
et al. 2016, Zizzamia et al. 2016).
Some of the dominant definitions suggest that the middle class
starts just where poverty ends (for example, see Ravallion, 2010).
By contrast, recent studies increasingly advocate the introduction
of an intermediate group that separates those who can satisfy their
most basic needs but remain on the verge of falling into poverty
from a more economically stable middle class (Ncube, Lufumpa,
& Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2011). Among the latter, López-Calva and
Ortiz-Juarez (2014) propose an approach to defining the middle
class that is anchored in the notion of economic security. They
argue that middle-class households should face a maximum risk
of 10 percent of falling into poverty, which they define as the max-
imum acceptable degree of vulnerability for being considered mid-
dle class. For a set of Latin American countries, the authors
associate this vulnerability threshold with a minimum income
requirement of USD 10 per capita per day. Replicating the
approach, Zizzamia et al. (2016) identify a similar vulnerability
threshold of USD 13 for the specific case of South Africa.1
This paper takes the conceptually appealing approach of defin-
ing the middle class based on a vulnerability criterion as a starting
point. In our view, in the low- and middle-income country context,
any discussion on the middle class cannot be detached from a dis-
cussion of poverty dynamics. In line with the arguments brought
forward by López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) and others, we
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tance for any discussion of social stratification, for two main rea-
sons: First, the economic insecurity associated with being
vulnerable to poverty reduces the well-being of households, even
if a deterioration in material well-being does not materialize (for
evidence from the psychological and health literature, see Cafiero
& Vakis, 2006). In other words, it is not only current income or con-
sumption that matter for actual welfare, ‘‘but also the risks a
household faces, as well as its (in)ability to prevent, mitigate and
cope with these” (Klasen & Povel, 2013: 17). Second, vulnerability
has the potential to create poverty traps. Households facing a high
ex-ante risk of deterioration in well-being are more likely to opt for
stable, low-return sources of income than to invest in activities
with more lucrative but also more uncertain outcomes (see
Dercon, 2006; Cafiero & Vakis, 2006). These arguments, however,
apply equally to households above and below the poverty line.
That is, vulnerability not only concerns the risk of slipping into
poverty but can also be understood as the risk of remaining poor
or falling deeper into poverty. Thus, as in the tradition of poverty
analysis, it is essential to differentiate not only between the vul-
nerable and the more stable middle class, but also between the
chronic poor and the transient poor, each of which may have very
different policy needs. That is, it is important to identify not only
those at greatest risk of slipping into poverty, but also those with
the highest chances of (re-)escaping from poverty. For these rea-
sons, we aim to imbed the definition of the middle class in a
broader schema of social stratification that looks at mobility pat-
terns not only above but also below the poverty line.2.2. Multilayered social-stratification schema
The proposed multilayered social-stratification schema is pre-
sented in Fig. 1. We define five social classes that diverge both in
their absolute average standard of living and their risk of remain-
ing in or falling into poverty.
We begin by assuming a standard division of society into three
main classes: the poor or the lower class, the middle class, and the
elite or the upper class. We understand the poor as those who are
in an economically precarious situation in the present period,
which does not allow them to satisfy their basic needs. In other
words, the poor are those who fall below some commodity-based
poverty line reflecting the average estimated cost of a consumption
basket that is deemed to be adequate, with respect to both food
and non-food components, in the respective national context
(compare Section 3.1). Similarly, we understand the elite as those
in society who enjoy a standard of living well above the national
average. For the empirical application, we will arbitrarily fix the
elite threshold at two standard deviations above the mean per cap-
ita household expenditure.2
Taking on a dynamic perspective, we introduce two further sub-
layers (see Fig. 1). Based on our model of poverty transitions, pre-
sented below, we can predict each person’s propensity to remain in
or fall into poverty in the near future – based on the household
characteristics and the observed poverty status at present. We
believe that these forward-looking scores provide a more compre-
hensive understanding of a person’s (medium-term) welfare pro-
spects than what we could gain by focusing exclusively on
reported expenditure levels. Based on these latent poverty propen-2 The definition of the upper or elite threshold is not the focus of this paper. The
size of the middle class can be expected to be relatively robust to minor variations in
this threshold, given that it lies in the upper tail of the distribution. However, while
we consider the exact cut-off point to be less of a concern, we believe the definition of
an elite group to be particularly relevant in the South African context, which is
marked by an outstanding concentration of wealth at the top of the distribution,
particularly in the top quintile (see Zizzamia et al., 2016).sities, we distinguish those with chances of exiting poverty below
the observed average exit rate and thus a comparatively high risk
of poverty persistence – the chronic poor – from those with above
average chances of making it out of poverty – the transient poor.3
Analogously, among those currently above the poverty line, we dis-
tinguish those who face an above average risk of slipping into pov-
erty – the vulnerable – from the more secure ‘‘actual” middle class,
whose members face a below average risk of falling into poverty
and thus have better chances of sustaining a living above the subsis-
tence level.2.3. Econometric modeling of the risk of poverty
In order to operationalize the conceptual framework presented
above, an econometric approach to modeling the chances of pov-
erty entry and exit is required. We follow an approach developed
by Cappellari and Jenkins (2002, 2004, 2008) drawing on Stewart
and Swaffield (1999). The strength of this approach is that it simul-
taneously accounts for initial condition effects, unobserved hetero-
geneity, and non-random panel attrition. Section 3.1 illustrates the
importance of these four key factors, which have been insuffi-
ciently addressed in existing studies that define the middle class
based on a simpler model of poverty risks. The approach consists
of the estimation of a multivariate probit model that jointly esti-
mates a system of three equations, including (1) a first-order Mar-
kov process of poverty transitions between two consecutive panel
waves, t  1and t, (2) the poverty status at t  1 (to account for the
potential endogeneity of initial conditions), and (3) an equation for
sample retention (to consider potential non-random attrition),
allowing free correlation between the unobservables affecting each
of these three processes (see Appendix A for details). By specifying
the current poverty status to be a function of the realized discrete
poverty outcome in the last period (following a standard approach
pioneered by Heckman, 1976), we allow the impact of the variables
that explain current poverty to vary according to whether or not
the individual or household was initially poor. This way, the spec-
ification provides estimates for both poverty persistence and entry
rates.
While previous studies that define the middle class based on a
simpler model of poverty risks have neglected to do so, controlling
for the observed and unobserved determinants of initial poverty
status is essential in the presence of state dependence – that is, if
households that have experienced poverty in the past are more
prone to experiencing poverty in the future. In this regard, genuine
state dependence would imply that the poverty experience itself
increases future poverty risks – for example, due to poverty- or
risk-related changes in behavior, constraints posed to future
choices, or the depreciation of human capital. However, the persis-
tence of poverty may also be attributed at least partly to sorting
effects, given that individuals or households with more favorable
characteristics tend to leave poverty earlier. This implies that those
who are observed to be poor in each survey wave tend to be a non-
random sample of the population, as individuals with a higher ten-
dency to remain permanently poor are likely to be overrepresented
in the sample. Similarly, non-random panel attrition may lead to a
bias in poverty risk estimates if individuals or households with
more favorable characteristics are more (or less) likely to leave in
the sample. For these reasons, it is important to account for the
endogeneity of both initial conditions and panel retention, a3 Note that the extent of chronic poverty according to this relative, forward-looking
definition will be approximately five percentage points lower than what standard
measures of chronic poverty – such as the spells (see, e.g., Bane & Ellwood, 1986) or
the components approach (see Jalan & Ravallion, 1998) – would suggest for South
Africa.
Fig. 1. Schema of social stratification based on current living standards and mobility patterns Source: Authors’ representation. Note: Solid lines denote absolute expenditure
thresholds. Dashed lines denote probability thresholds.
4 The line is one of three national poverty lines published by Stats SA in 2015 using
a cost-of-basic-needs (CoBN) approach to capture different degrees of poverty. Of
these, the food poverty line (FPL) is the level of consumption below which individuals
are unable to purchase sufficient food to fulfil their caloric requirements, even if all
expenditure is dedicated to food. The lower-bound poverty line (LBPL) allows for
spending on non-food items, but requires that individuals sacrifice some food
consumption in order to fulfil these non-food needs. Only at the upper-bound poverty
line (UBPL) can individuals purchase both adequate food and non-food items.
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approach (for a detailed discussion, see Heckman, 1981).
3. An empirical application of the stratification schema: The
case of South Africa
In the following, we provide an empirical application of the
multilayered stratification schema introduced above. South Africa
is chosen as a case study for three reasons: First, it has been iden-
tified as one of the countries in sub-Sahara Africa with a relatively
large and growing middle class (Ncube et al., 2011). Second, despite
important advances towards poverty reduction over the past two
decades, the level of economic inequality in the country remains
among the highest in the world (see inter alia Leibbrandt, Finn, &
Woolard, 2012; Özler, 2007). Third, while panel datasets are
becoming available for an increasing number of low- and
middle-income countries, South Africa is among the few countries
where multiple survey rounds have been collected at regular and
not too widely spaced intervals.
3.1. Data, definitions and descriptive poverty transitions
Our econometric analysis uses panel data from the South Afri-
can National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) implemented by SAL-
DRU at the University of Cape Town (SALDRU 2016a, b, c, d). NIDS
is South Africa’s first national panel study, which started with a
nationally representative sample of over 28,000 individuals in
7,300 households. At present, there are four waves of data avail-
able, each of which is spaced approximately two years apart, with
the first survey having been conducted in 2008. For the dynamic
analysis, individuals need to be successfully tracked over at least
two consecutive survey waves. Data from pairs of consecutive
waves have been pooled, such that transitions that occurred from
wave 1 to wave 2, wave 2 to wave 3, and wave 3 to wave 4 are trea-
ted identically in the analysis, controlling for period-specific fixed
effects. The restricted sample of individuals with two consecutive
waves of non-missing expenditure data contains 74,217
observations.
All monetary values used in this paper are deflated to January
2015 prices using the Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) headline
consumer price index (Stats SA, 2015a). Following Stats SA’s gen-
eral practice, poverty is defined in terms of per capita household
expenditure, which is assumed to provide a better approximationof permanent household income than the reported income. We
understand the satisfaction of basic needs as a necessary condition
for being considered middle class. Households are thus classified as
being poor versus non-poor using Stats SA’s (2015b) upper-bound
poverty line (UBPL), which is set at R963 per person per month,
equivalent to approximately USD 5.5 a day (in 2011 PPPs). I few
use a cost-of-basic-needs (CoBN) approach, the line represents
the consumption level at which both food and non-food needs
should be met.4
Before we proceed to the model, Table 1 illustrates the rele-
vance of issues such as state dependence, initial conditions, and
selective attrition. Panel (a) shows the raw poverty transition
matrix. As can be seen, the chance of being poor is on average
57.4 percentage points higher for those who were poor in the pre-
vious survey wave than for the non-poor. The applied modeling
approach will allow us to separate the extent to which this average
poverty persistence is explained by heterogeneities in the charac-
teristics of the initially poor versus the non-poor from the extent
to which it can be ascribed to the past poverty experience itself
(genuine state dependence).
Panel (b) of Table 1 draws attention to the potential issue of
non-random panel attrition. While the 2008 sample was drawn
on a nationally representative basis and the poverty headcount
(UBPL) calculated from this data closely matches official statistics,
the poverty trends observed over subsequent waves appear to
overstate the reduction in poverty, particularly in the last two
waves of the NIDS. This makes it likely that individuals with a
lower risk of poverty where somewhat more likely to remain in
the sample. As discussed above, the applied approach explicitly
controls for the observable and unobservable factors that are asso-
ciated with both poverty dynamics and panel retention. In this
way, we aim to limit the effect of potential attrition bias on our
estimates.
Table 1
Poverty inflow and outflow rates (row %) between survey waves.
Poverty status, year t  1 Poverty status, yeart
Non-
poor
Poor Missing
(a) Sample with non-missing expenditure at t
Non-poor 73.97 26.03
Poor 16.59 83.41
All 35.55 64.45
(b) All individuals
Non-poor 55.34 19.47 25.19
Poor 14.20 71.42 14.37
All 29.05 52.67 18.28
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified
weights).
Notes: Respondents are classified as poor if their household’s per capita expenditure
falls below the Stats SA UBPL of R992 (in January 2015 prices). Missing expenditure
data at t arise either from sample attrition or incomplete response (see text for
further details). The post-stratified survey weights used here have not been cor-
rected for panel attrition.
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As the NIDS is an individual-level panel, individuals can switch
households between waves. This implies that members of the same
initial household may take different poverty trajectories. Neverthe-
less, all explanatory variables entering the poverty transitions
equation are measured at the household level. This decision was
necessary as the subsequent class analysis requires the predicted
poverty scores (determining class membership) to be identical
across household members. However, to check the robustness of
this approach, we ran two alternative specifications: In one we
included individual level controls, which were largely statistically
insignificant. In the other, we reduced the sample to household
heads only. The parameter estimates were largely consistent across
specifications, giving some confidence that the chosen approach
did do not cause any systematic bias in coefficient estimates.5
The choice of regressors follows the previous literature. The
explanatory variables either refer to the household head, including
demographics (age, age squared, gender, and race), level of educa-
tion, labor market status, and job type, or to the household itself,
including a set of variables capturing the composition and age
structure of the household, the number of employed household
members, the household’s access to basic services, and controls
for geographic location. Importantly, all variables were measured
in the base year (wave t  1) prior to a potential poverty transition
(experienced in wave t) and, in line with most of the poverty mod-
eling literature, are thus assumed to be predetermined. For this
very reason, variables summarizing the occurrence of economic
shocks or other types of events triggering poverty descents are
not used in this specification. However, given that the existing lit-
erature has identified a high extent of churning in the South Afri-
can labor market (for example, see Kerr, 2018), which is likely to
have important dynamic implications for households’ welfare, we
have paid particularly close attention to capturing the stability of
employment relationships, approximated by formality, contract
type, unionization, and public sector share.
Statistical identification of the model parameters requires
exclusion restrictions. Specifically, we need to find a set of instru-
mental variables that affect initial poverty status or sample reten-
tion, but have no direct effect on poverty transitions (see Appendix
A for details). This is not an easy task, given that these are intricate
social processes. For the base-year poverty status, Cappellari and5 The regression results from the robustness tests are available from the authors
upon request.Jenkins (2002) use parental occupation to proxy for parental
socioeconomic status during childhood. Diverging slightly from
their original approach, we suggest using a set of instruments sum-
marizing both the mother’s and the father’s highest level of educa-
tion attained (also including variables to indicate missing
information on the items of interest). In the psychological litera-
ture investigating the long-term effect of parents’ education, it
has been shown that the parental educational level during child-
hood significantly affects educational aspirations and the educa-
tional level in late adolescence, but – beyond these indirect
effects – has no direct effects on children’s educational and occupa-
tional outcomes in adulthood (Dubow et al., 2009). Similarly, the
key assumption here is that parental schooling affects the initial
poverty status, but has no direct effect on the wave-to-wave tran-
sition probabilities. We add controls for the kind of work usually
done by the parent in the current or last job in order to separate
those labor market effects likely adding to the current income sit-
uation from the factors determining the respondent’s parental
background. Thus, the explanatory variables for initial conditions
include all the variables that explain poverty transitions plus the
parental background indicators, which are assumed to have a
direct impact on the initial poverty status in the base period, but
not on poverty entry or exit in subsequent waves.
Following Cappellari and Jenkins (2002, 2004, 2008), the set of
instruments for sample retention includes a binary variable indi-
cating whether the respondent is an original sample member
(OSM) who has been in the NIDS panel since the first wave, or
joined the survey later as temporary sample member (TSM) by
moving into or being born into an OSM household. Our key
assumption here is that OSMs are more stable survey members
compared to TSMs and that sample membership status has no
direct effect on the poverty transition propensity. Thus, the
explanatory variables for the panel retention equation include all
the variables to explain poverty transitions plus the sample mem-
bership control, which is assumed to affect panel retention or attri-
tion, but be orthogonal to the poverty transition propensity.6
Regarding the parental background indicators, the test results
reported in Table 2 indicate that mothers’ schooling is significantly
correlated with the initial poverty status and excludable from the
poverty transition equation, whereas fathers’ schooling does not
satisfy the exclusion restriction. The variable for original sample
membership can be excluded from the poverty transition equation,
and is statistically significant in the sample retention equation. We
are confident that the controls for mothers’ schooling and original
sample membership allow for the identification of the system of
equations.
In order to assess the exogeneity of the two selection mecha-
nisms to the process of poverty transitions, we tested the separate
and joint significance of the correlation coefficients. In line with
previous findings in the literature, we observe a negative and sta-
tistically significant correlation between the unobservables affect-
ing initial and conditional current poverty (q21). This can be
interpreted as an example of Galtonian regression towards the
mean (Stewart & Swaffield, 1999). The correlation between the
unobservables affecting poverty transitions and sample retention
(q32) is not significantly different from zero. However, there is a
significant positive correlation between the unobservables affect-
ing initial poverty and sample retention (q32) (see Table 2, panel
(a)).
The related exogeneity tests are reported in panel (b) of Table 2.
Exogeneity of initial conditions would imply that q23 and q32 are
jointly zero – a hypothesis that is strongly rejected (Wald test6 We tried adding a dummy variable to the set of instruments for whether or not
the respondent was classified by the interviewer as friendly and very attentive.
However, this variable did not fulfil the exclusion restriction.
Table 2
Estimates of model correlations, and model test statistics.
Estimate s.e.
(a) Correlation coefficients between unobservables
Base year poverty status and conditional current poverty status (q21) 0.319*** 0.053
Sample retention and conditional current poverty status (q31) 0.018 0.025
Sample retention and base year poverty status (q32) 0.059* 0.025
Null hypotheses for tests Test statistic p-value
(b) Wald test for exogeneity of selection equations
Exogeneity of initial conditions, q21 = q32 = 0 41.48*** 0.0000
Exogeneity of sample retention,q31 ¼ q32 ¼ 0 6.09** 0.0476
Joint exogeneity,q21 ¼ q31 ¼ q32 ¼ 0 43.83*** 0.0000
(c) Instrument validity
Exclusion of mother’s schooling from transition equation (d.f. = 10) 8.97 0.5397
Exclusion of sample membership status from transition equation (d.f. = 2) 4.69 0.1157
Exclusion of mother’s schooling and sample membership status from transition equation (d.f. = 20) 13.74 0.3176
Inclusion of mother’s schooling in initial conditions equation (d.f. = 5) 28.49*** 0.0000
Inclusion of sample membership status in retention equation (d.f. = 1) 352.74*** 0.0000
(d) Test of state dependence
No state dependence,c1 ¼ c2 249.59*** 0.0000
Asymptotic standard errors are robust for the presence of repeated observations on the same individual.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights).
Note: Simulated pseudo maximum likelihood estimation with 250 random draws.
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that q31 and q32 are jointly zero. Here, the null hypothesis is
rejected at the 5 percent significance level (Wald test
p < 0:0476). Both initial conditions and sample retention will thus
be considered endogenous to the model. We will use the coeffi-
cient estimates from the panel retention equation to adjust the
survey weights in the pooled panel to account for unfolding attri-
tion. That is, respondents who were tracked over two consecutive
waves will receive a new weight, calculated as the product of the
original post-stratified weight of the initial period and the inverse
of the conditional probability of re-interview.
Last but not least, a test of whether the two sets of coefficient
estimates are identical for initially poor versus non-poor individu-
als can be rejected at all common significance levels (see Table 2,
panel (d)). That is to say, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there
is significant genuine state dependence, with past poverty experi-
ences affecting the likelihood of future poverty.
3.3. Estimated effects of the explanatory variables on transition
probabilities
The coefficient estimates from the poverty transitions equation
are reported in Table 3. (The estimates for the initial poverty status
and sample retention are provided in Tables B.1 and B.2 in the
Appendix). Two sets of estimates are reported, depending on the
initial poverty status. The first (second) set shows the marginal
effect of a change in the respective characteristics of the household
on the probability of poverty persistence (entry), which is the like-
lihood of being poor in the current survey wave for someone who
was poor (non-poor) in the past survey wave. It is important to
note that poverty persistence and poverty exit are mutually exclu-
sive events. This implies that any variable that is estimated to
increase (reduce) the likelihood of poverty persistence, will auto-
matically reduce (increase) the chances of poverty exit to exactly
the same extent. The same logic applies to the estimated chances
of poverty entry as opposed to resilience to poverty.
In terms of demographic characteristics, the findings reported
in Table 3 indicate that households with younger heads tend to
be more prone to changes in poverty status. As expected, members
of households that are female headed, rural, and have a largernumber of dependents face a higher risk of poverty. Race remains
a strong predictor of poverty in South Africa, with Africans being at
the highest risk, even after controlling for differences in education
and employment. Higher levels of household-head education are
associated with a lower vulnerability to poverty, although effect
sizes vary considerably between initially poor and non-poor
households.
With respect to the labor market, we find that having a working
head does not necessarily mean lower vulnerability to poverty.
Amongst those who are employed, we differentiate between five
types of economic activity, including subsistence agriculture
(which accounts for a marginal share of total employment in South
Africa), casual work, self-employment, employees with a tempo-
rary or time-limited work contract, and employees with a perma-
nent work contract. The effect depends crucially on the type of
employment that the head engages in, and especially its stability
and duration. Specifically, members of households where the head
works as a regular employee with a permanent work contract face
a significantly lower risk of poverty. By contrast, for those with
temporary work contracts or a contract of unspecified duration,
the effect is not statistically significant. Also self-employment on
the part of the household head can reduce the risk of poverty.
The effect is, however, substantially larger if the business is in
the formal and not the informal sector. Those living in households
where the head is casually employed or works in a family business
(without pay) are up to 4 percent more likely to remain poor than
those in households with inactive heads.
While the effects for most of the explanatory variables point in
the same direction for both sets of estimates, the size of the effect
on the poverty propensities differs substantially for some variables,
depending on whether or not the individual was already poor in
the initial period. Specifically, we observe that both education
and employment (including the employment status of the house-
hold head and the number of other employed household members)
have a smaller poverty-risk reducing effect for the initially poor
than the non-poor. One of the channels through which a past pov-
erty experience could increase the risk of future poverty is the
depreciation of human capital, as well as potential signaling effects
for employers and the potential acceptance of low quality job
offers that may be associated with future unemployment spells.
Table 3
Multivariate probit model: Poverty transitions.
Probability of being poor in t conditional on poverty status in t1 Poverty persistence Poverty entry
Average Marginal
Effect
Coeff.
Estimate
s.e. Average Marginal
Effect
Coeff.
Estimate
s.e.
Characteristics of the household head (HoH) in t1
HoH age 0.001 0.006 (0.004) 0.005 0.018** (0.008)
HoH age squared (x0.01) 0.002 0.009** (0.004) 0.000 0.001 (0.008)
HoH is female 0.017 0.070*** (0.024) 0.095 0.330*** (0.041)
HoH race group (base: African)
Colored 0.005 0.022 (0.053) 0.121 0.411*** (0.064)
Asian/Indian 0.407 1.278*** (0.153) 0.293 1.144*** (0.116)
White 0.426 1.336*** (0.279) 0.287 1.109*** (0.107)
HoH education (base: no schooling)
Less than primary completed 0.011 0.050 (0.032) 0.110 0.356*** (0.088)
Primary completed 0.023 0.102** (0.044) 0.128 0.415*** (0.096)
Secondary not completed 0.027 0.113*** (0.034) 0.202 0.656*** (0.085)
Secondary completed 0.067 0.265*** (0.051) 0.288 0.952*** (0.101)
Tertiary 0.215 0.752*** (0.078) 0.340 1.147*** (0.107)
HoH employment status (base: inactive)
Unemployed (discouraged) 0.021 0.094 (0.059) 0.066 0.233** (0.110)
Unemployed (strict) 0.002 0.007 (0.039) 0.056 0.194** (0.079)
Subsistence farmer 0.010 0.045 (0.064) 0.003 0.010 (0.149)
Casual worker/helping others 0.029 0.127** (0.061) 0.148 0.511*** (0.181)
Self-employed 0.021 0.087 (0.054) 0.076 0.262*** (0.079)
Self-employed # Formala 0.066 0.322* (0.174) 0.217 0.493*** (0.134)
Employee 0.000 0.001 (0.041) 0.047 0.161** (0.069)
Employee # Permanent contract 0.032 0.128** (0.052) 0.090 0.150** (0.061)
Employee # Union member 0.025 0.101* (0.062) 0.098 0.178*** (0.057)
Employee # Share public sectorb 0.057 0.225** (0.093) 0.153 0.372*** (0.093)
Characteristics of the household (HH) in t1
Composition of the HH
No. of members in HH 0.007 0.027*** (0.008) 0.037 0.125*** (0.020)
No. of workers in HH (excl. HoH) 0.021 0.087*** (0.015) 0.058 0.208*** (0.029)
No. of children (<18 years) 0.024 0.099*** (0.011) 0.005 0.016 (0.025)
No. of elderly members (60+ years) 0.002 0.007 (0.021) 0.057 0.200*** (0.037)
HH has access to basic goods and services (shelter/water/
sanitation/electricity)
0.040 0.165*** (0.032) 0.027 0.095** (0.046)
Geographic location (base: traditional) c
Urban 0.006 0.026 (0.032) 0.058 0.198*** (0.055)
Farms 0.031 0.138*** (0.048) 0.060 0.205** (0.091)
Constant 0.825*** (0.123) 0.923*** (0.205)
Province fixed effects YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES
Log-likelihood 97,980,000
Model chi2 (d.f. = 174) 23,842
Number of observations 67,117
Asymptotic standard errors are robust for the presence of repeated observations on the same individual.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights).
Notes: Simulated pseudo maximum likelihood estimation with 250 random draws.
1. Urban – A continuously built-up area that is established through cities, towns, ‘townships’, small towns, and hamlets.
2. Traditional – Communally owned land under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders. Settlements within these areas are villages.
3. Farms – Land allocated for and used for commercial farming including the structures and infrastructure on it.
Those parts of the country falling under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities (or traditional chiefs) are considered as rural, mainly due to their lack of infrastructure as a
result of historical events.
a For self-employed, formal businesses are registered for income tax &/or VAT.
b The average share of public sector employment by industry and survey year has been calculated from the 2008, 2010/11, 2012, and 2014/2015 Quarterly Labor Force
Surveys.
c In line with the 2011 census, three settlement types are distinguished in NIDS:
7 Note the slight difference from the transition probabilities reported in Table 1,
which arises from the use of attrition-adjusted weights derived from the retention
equation (see p.13 for details).
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poor and non-poor household heads.
3.4. Class thresholds
We use the estimates from the switching model presented to
predict the poverty exit and entry probabilities of initially poor
versus non-poor individuals. These are evaluated against two prob-
ability thresholds, displayed in Table 4 panel (a), based on the
actual observed rates of poverty exit and entry in our data. We
observe that, on average, 16.5 percent of the initially poor escaped
poverty between one wave and the next in the pooled sample. This
observed average rate of poverty exit is set as the cut-off point sep-arating the chronic poor from the transient poor. Analogously, we
observe that the average probability of falling into poverty for
those who were initially non-poor was 25.9 percent in our pooled
sample. This observed average rate of poverty entry is set as the
cut-off point separating the vulnerable from the middle class.7
For comparative purposes, we also give an indication of the
monetary thresholds associated with these probability cut-offs.
To do so, we calculate the average monthly per capita household
expenditure of those respondents whose predicted poverty transi-
Table 4
Probability thresholds and associated monetary thresholds.
(a) Probability threshold (%) (b) Associated monetary
threshold
Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf.
Int.]
Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf.
Int.]
Average probability of EXITING poverty for those who were poor in the last period 16.52 0.16 16.21 16.84 543 6 532 555
Average probability of FALLING into poverty for those who were non-poor in the last period 25.91 0.36 25.21 26.61 2590 85 2422 2757
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights corrected for panel attrition).
Note: Poverty transition probabilities are predicted using parameter estimates from our regression model. The associated monetary thresholds are calculated as the average
per capita household expenditure of those falling into the 95% confidence interval around the respective probability threshold. All monetary values are expressed in January
2015 rands.
8 The 2008 NIDS sample was drawn on a nationally representative basis and the
poverty headcount (UBPL) calculated from this data based on per capita household
income (56.7) or expenditure (60.1 percent) closely matches official statistics (56.8
percent). However, the poverty trends observed over subsequent waves should be
treated with caution. Using household expenditure, poverty increased up to 2010/11,
with a remarkable rise of five percentage points in the share of households being
pushed below the food poverty line. From 2010/11 to 2014/15 poverty levels
decreased, with the strongest fall observed from 2012 to 2014/15. This general trend
is consistent across key variables and robust across subsamples. When using incomes
instead of expenditures, an even stronger fall in the poverty headcount by more than
10 percentage points between 2008 and 2014/15 is observed. A similar pattern
emerges when the sample is restricted to respondents that were successfully
interviewed in all four waves. However, particularly the strong reduction in poverty
over the last two years of NIDS may raise doubts, given that it was not mirrored by
any major event at the macro level. The trend might in part be explained by changes
in the NIDS sample (see Section 3.1), and should therefore be interpreted with
caution.
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the respective probability threshold. We find that the average
probability of exiting poverty is associated with a monetary
threshold of R543 per person per month, which falls between Stats
SA’s food poverty line (R441) and the lower-bound poverty line
(R647). The average probability of entering poverty is associated
with a monetary threshold of R2,590 per person per month. Thus,
on average, respondents living in households with expenditure
levels above this threshold could be considered reasonably secure
against falling into poverty.
Using these monetary thresholds as cut-off points, however,
would mask a substantial degree of variation in the predicted pov-
erty propensities among individuals living in households with sim-
ilar current expenditure levels, as Table 5 illustrates. Although the
transient poor tend, on average, to be better off than the chronic
poor, members of both groups can be found anywhere below the
poverty line. Similarly, while the middle class is on average better
off than the vulnerable, members of both groups can be located
anywhere between the poverty line and the elite cut-off (R10,484).
In consequence, by applying a monetary threshold to distin-
guish those who are non-poor but vulnerable from those who are
stably middle class, we would risk making two misclassification
errors. First, there may be households that fall below the vulnera-
bility thresholds, but have access to a relatively secure income
flow, which will help them to sustain their living standard over
time. As Table 6 illustrates, almost four out of 10 individuals who
would be classified as vulnerable by their income position would
be classified by us as middle class given their household character-
istics. Second, there may be households for which we observe a
current consumption level above the vulnerability threshold, but
which face an elevated risk of poverty and will likely not be able
to sustain their current living standard over time. This applies to
two out of 10 individuals, who would be classified as middle class
based on their income position but whom we would consider to be
vulnerable given their household characteristics. The same logic
applies to the distinction between chronic versus transient pov-
erty. For approximately one out of 10 individuals with per capita
household expenditures of less than R543 we would predict above
average chances of escaping poverty, while we would view five out
of 10 individuals with expenditures above that threshold as having
an above average risk of remaining poor.
In Table 7 we compare the relative size of the five social classes
when probability thresholds, as opposed to monetary thresholds,
are used to distinguish the class sublayers. We observe that the
middle class, which we identify using the latent poverty propen-
sity, is approximately five percentage points larger (and, accord-
ingly, the group of the vulnerable is five percentage points
smaller) than when a monetary threshold is applied. That is, by
using a monetary threshold to identify the middle class, we risk
missing out on a non-negligible share of the population that falls
below that threshold but is nevertheless relatively secure against
falling into poverty. Despite the middle class identified in thisway being larger, on average, only 9.5 percent (as compared to
9.7 percent when identified using the monetary threshold) fell
below the poverty line within a two-year time horizon. Further-
more, by directly basing the classification on the latent poverty
propensity scores, we are better able to identify those with an ele-
vated risk of poverty than when we rely on monetary measures
alone. Almost every second person who we classify as vulnerable
actually fell into poverty within two years’ time. Table 7 also shows
that the extent of chronic poverty would have been underesti-
mated if a monetary threshold had been used.
4. Class formations, social inequality and mobility in South
Africa
In this section, we provide a profile of the five social strata – the
chronic poor, the transient poor, the vulnerable, the middle class,
and the elite – identified specifically for South African case.
4.1. Class characteristics and inequality patterns
As Fig. 2 illustrates, we find that according to the suggested
stratification schema, approximately one in four (24 percent)
South Africans could be classified as stably middle class or elite.
Their combined share remained relatively stable between 2008
and 2014/15. In addition, over this period approximately 14 per-
cent of the population fell within the group of the vulnerable. That
is, a substantial share of the non-poor still faced a considerable risk
of falling into poverty. On the other hand, among the poor, approx-
imately 80 percent could be considered chronic poor (comprising
half of the total population), whereas the remaining 20 percent
(accounting for 13 percent of the total population between 2008
and 2014/15) could be classified as transient poor.8
Tables 8 and 9 provide an overview of the key average
characteristics of households in general and household heads in
particular among the five social classes. By construction, the char-
acteristics closely mirror the determinants of poverty transitions
reported in Section 3.3.
Table 5
Monthly household expenditure per person by social class, 2008 to 2014/15.
Min Max Median Mean [95% Conf. Interval]
Chronic Poor 29 992 342 390 388 391
Transient Poor 24 991 617 617 613 620
Vulnerable 992 10,418 1586 2045 2024 2066
Middle class 993 10,470 3319 3987 3946 4029
Elite 10,488 131,514 15,347 19,251 18,693 19,809
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights corrected for panel attrition).
Note: All monetary values are expressed in January 2015 rands.
Table 6
Classes identified by poverty propensity versus monetary thresholds, 2008 to 2014/15.
Pooled Sample (two consecutive
waves)
Probability Threshold
Chronic Transient Vulnerable Middle Class Elite Total
Monetary Chronic poor 88.72 11.28 0 0 0 100
Transient poor 58.39 41.61 0 0 0 100
Vulnerable 0 0 60.44 39.56 0 100
Middle class 0 0 18.53 81.47 0 100
Elite 0 0 0 0 100 100
Total 49.44 12.80 14.37 19.69 3.70 100
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights corrected for panel attrition).
Table 7
Average class size and mobility patterns by identification method, 2008 to 2014/15.
Probability Thresholds Monetary Thresholds
Population
Share (%)
Share (%) that fell into
poverty
Share (%) that moved out of
poverty
Population
Share (%)
Share (%) that fell into
poverty
Share (%) that moved out of
poverty
Chronic Poor 49.44 .. 10.63 43.21 .. 10.53
Transient
Poor
12.80 .. 40.28 19.03 .. 31.02
Vulnerable 14.37 49.72 .. 19.24 40.24 ..
Middle class 19.69 9.54 .. 14.82 9.72 ..
Elite 3.70 2.80 .. 3.70 2.80 ..
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights corrected for panel attrition).
Note: All monetary values are expressed in January 2015 rands.
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Fig. 2. Class sizes, 2008 to 2014/15. Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves
1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights corrected for panel attrition).
9 We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this notion, which – in
our view – very well reflects the structural affinity of transient poor and vulnerable
households.
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cally poor live in households that count five members on average,
which is approximately twice the size of households in the middle
class. Of the five members, about half (2.5) are below age 18 and
two are below age 15. Accordingly, we observe that poverty in gen-
eral and chronic poverty in particular overproportionately affect
children in South Africa. Approximately three in four children
(74.6 percent) below age 15 live in poverty, with approximately
two in three (64.9 percent) growing up in a situation of persistent
poverty. By contrast, only 14 percent of all children below 15 years
can be classified as stably middle class or elite. This finding is par-
ticularly worrisome given that being raised in poverty tends toincrease the risk of poverty in adulthood, likely contributing to a
cycle of chronic poverty. Moreover, given our observation that
most households, independent of their size, rely on a single-
income earner, this implies that the working poor not only have
substantially lower labor incomes but generally also need to take
care of a substantially higher number of dependents (see Table 8).
A key finding from the application of our stratification schema
to the South African case is that there is a close similarity between
the transient poor and the vulnerable in terms of both household
composition and the composition of income sources available to
the household. From a static perspective, these two groups are dis-
tinct in terms of their realized consumption, which falls below or
exceeds the cost-of-basic-needs poverty line, respectively. How-
ever, as our stratification schema shows, the distinction between
these groups is much less meaningful in a dynamic sense, with
large parts of both groups predicted to swap places on either side
of the poverty line over time. Compared to the transient poor,
household size is somewhat smaller for the vulnerable. This sug-
gests that simply acquiring a dependent in the household may be
enough to push those among the vulnerable below the poverty
line. Taking this dynamic perspective into account, these two
groups can essentially be considered two sides of the same coin.9
Table 8
Average household (HH) characteristics by social class, 2008 to 2014/15.
Chronic Poor Transient Poor Vulnerable Middle Class Elite Total
Weighted share of respondents 49.4% 12.8% 14.4% 19.7% 3.7% 100%
As percentage of poor 79.4% 20.6% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Weighted share of respondents under 15 years old 64.9% 9.7% 11.4% 12.7% 1.3% 100%
Mean household expenditure per capita 445 646 2161 4030 20,159 3054
Median household expenditure per capita 399 663 1651 3,368 16,364 1141
No. of members in HH 5.2 3.2 2.4 2.4 2.0 3.4
No. of workers in HH 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.0
Age composition
No. of children (<18 years) 2.5 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.3 1.2
No. of members of working age (18–60 years) 2.4 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.9
No. of elderly members (60+ years) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
Income by source a
Share of income derived from source
Labor 37.8% 64.8% 69.5% 81.9% 79.1% 62.9%
Government grants 51.3% 25.1% 16.9% 6.8% 2.1% 25.2%
Remittances 7.4% 7.9% 10.2% 3.8% 1.5% 6.6%
Subsistence agriculture 0.8% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4%
Investments 1.8% 1.2% 2.5% 7.1% 17.0% 4.3%
Mean income from source (if non-zero)
Labor 2798 4249 4843 12,642 32,342 8948
Government grants 1438 1167 1087 1408 1313 1334
Remittances 1333 1019 1592 1870 14,226 1812
Subsistence agriculture 178 133 410 545 1691 259
Investments 1845 1452 2308 13,095 14,281 9607
Access to services
House, cluster, town house 56.4% 65.5% 58.2% 69.4% 84.9% 63.4%
Tap water in house/on plot 56.1% 83.5% 79.2% 96.2% 98.2% 78.2%
Flush toilet in/outside house 30.4% 70.6% 63.1% 93.7% 97.4% 64.2%
Access to electricity 73.9% 84.5% 85.7% 95.9% 96.0% 85.2%
HH has access to basic goods and services (shelter/water/sanitation/electricity) 17.0% 49.0% 35.5% 64.0% 79.9% 42.0%
Geographic location b
Traditional 53.6% 17.8% 25.7% 5.2% 3.4% 26.5%
Urban 40.1% 77.3% 66.6% 91.9% 94.4% 68.3%
Farms 6.3% 4.9% 7.7% 2.9% 2.2% 5.2%
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights corrected for panel attrition).
Notes: All monetary values are expressed in January 2015 rands.
1. Urban – A continuously built-up area that is established through cities, towns, ‘townships’, small towns, and hamlets.
2. Traditional – Communally owned land under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders. Settlements within these areas are villages.
3. Farms – Land allocated for and used for commercial farming including the structures and infrastructure on it.
Those parts of the country falling under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities (or traditional chiefs) are considered as rural, mainly due to their lack of infrastructure as a
result of historical events.
a Imputed rental income has been excluded. Government grants include (i) state old-age pension, (ii) disability, (iii) child support, (iv) foster care, and (v) care dependency
grant. Other income from government includes (i) unemployment insurance fund and (ii) workmen’s compensation. Investment income includes (i) interest/dividend
income, (ii) rental income, and (iii) private pensions and annuities.
b In line with the 2011 census, three settlement types are distinguished in NIDS:
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Fig. 3. Population share of South Africa’s five social classes by province, 2008 to
2014/15. Source: Authors’ calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample
(post-stratified weights).
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grants is fairly stable across all five classes (probably because of
very broad access to old-age pensions). It is highest among the
chronic poor, at R1,438 (though this income is shared among sub-
stantially larger households), and lowest among the (relatively
young) vulnerable group, at R1,087 (see Table 8). While fairly con-
stant in absolute terms, the relative importance of social grants in
the lives of the poor cannot be overstated. Specifically, the chronic
poor derive more than half their income from government grants.
By comparison, grant money makes up one fourth of the income of
the transient poor and one sixth of the income of the vulnerable. In
the middle class, 6.8 percent of total household income is derived
from grants. In accordance with the existing literature, we find that
the middle class is the class that relies most heavily on the labor
market for its welfare (see Table 8).
A key difference between the chronic poor and the transient
poor appears to lie in their geographic location. Half of the chronic
poor reside in ‘‘traditional” areas, comprising traditional villages
and communally owned land, including those areas where the
former ‘‘homelands” were located. The same applies to only 17.8
percent of the transient poor. Relatedly, the chronic poor are the
most deprived in their access to basic goods and services. Only17 percent of the chronically poor households had access to elec-
tricity, flowing water, a flushable toilet and formal housing, as
compared to 50 percent of the transient poor and 64 percent of
the middle class.
Fig. 3 displays the distribution of the five social classes across
South Africa’s nine provinces. KwaZulu-Natal has the highest
incidence of chronic poverty and the second smallest middle class
(after Limpopo). At the same time, however, KwaZulu-Natal also
Table 9
Average characteristics of the head of household (HoH) by social class, 2008 to 2014/15.
Chronic Poor Transient Poor Vulnerable Middle Class Elite Total
Age 50 45 42 46 48 47
Female 69.4% 51.6% 58.3% 31.4% 28.1% 56.5%
Race
African 94.8% 81.6% 89.7% 45.7% 17.7% 79.9%
Colored 5.2% 14.0% 9.2% 14.0% 7.0% 8.7%
Asian/Indian 0.0% 2.5% 1.0% 7.7% 10.0% 2.3%
White 0.0% 1.9% 0.1% 32.7% 65.4% 9.1%
Education (average level if 25 years or older) 5 9 9 12 14 8
No schooling 25.5% 10.0% 8.7% 0.2% 0.7% 15.2%
Less than primary completed (grades 1 to 6) 27.0% 14.0% 15.5% 2.5% 1.3% 17.8%
Primary completed (grade 7) 11.7% 3.2% 8.3% 2.0% 1.9% 7.8%
Secondary not completed (grades 8 to 11) 31.0% 43.1% 45.6% 32.6% 8.9% 34.0%
Secondary completed (grade 12) 4.6% 14.3% 13.0% 24.0% 16.2% 11.3%
Tertiary 0.2% 15.4% 8.9% 38.8% 71.1% 13.8%
Employment status
Inactive 53.6% 34.9% 29.2% 19.9% 19.7% 39.9%
of which share of pensioners 35.6% 37.5% 27.3% 33.3% 35.6% 34.7%
Unemployed (discouraged) 3.6% 1.3% 2.0% 1.8% 0.5% 2.6%
Unemployed (strict) 12.0% 12.7% 12.0% 3.5% 1.2% 10.1%
Employed 30.8% 51.2% 56.7% 74.8% 78.6% 47.4%
Employment type (if EMPLOYED) 6.5% 6.3% 8.6% 6.9% 10.2% 7.2%
Employee 55.3% 77.3% 69.9% 85.5% 75.5% 71.4%
of which share in formal sector 52.6% 75.6% 71.2% 94.8% 92.3% 77.3%
of which share with permanent contract 36.2% 63.4% 48.9% 81.2% 79.6% 61.8%
of which share member in trade union 13.8% 33.3% 23.9% 51.0% 29.7% 33.3%
of which expected share in public sector 12.9% 21.1% 15.0% 28.9% 23.7% 21.1%
Self-employed 17.7% 14.7% 16.3% 9.4% 18.1% 14.5%
of which share in formal sector 2.6% 14.4% 12.6% 63.1% 70.0% 23.0%
Casual worker/ helping others 15.7% 4.6% 9.6% 1.0% 0.7% 7.7%
Subsistence agriculture 9.1% 1.3% 1.8% 0.3% 0.3% 3.5%
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights corrected for panel attrition).
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98 S. Schotte et al. /World Development 110 (2018) 88–103has the fourth largest elite (after Gauteng, the Western Cape, and
Mpumalanga), indicating a substantial degree of local social
inequality. Chronic poverty is lowest in the Western Cape and in
Gauteng, which are also the two provinces with the strongest mid-
dle class and elite. While vulnerability is substantial in all pro-
vinces, including those provinces with low levels of chronic
poverty, we observe a negative relationship between the extent
of chronic and transient poverty across the provinces (see Fig. 3).
Table 9 explores the average characteristics of the head of
household by social class. With an average age of 42 years, house-
hold heads in the vulnerable class tend to be younger than those in
the other classes, which may be associated with a less stable posi-
tion in the labor market. With an average age of 50 years, house-
hold heads tend among those living in chronic poverty tend to be
the oldest. This may be linked to processes of household formation,
where adult children or grandchildren cohabit with (grand)parents
who receive a government old-age pension, thus forming larger,
intergenerational households (see Klasen & Woolard, 2009). Fur-
thermore, seven out of 10 chronically poor individuals live in
households where the household head is female, as compared to
five to six out of 10 among the transient poor and vulnerable
classes, and three out of 10 among the middle class and elite. This
in part reflects the higher incidence of poverty and vulnerability to
poverty among single mothers in South Africa.
Given that race tends to be a strong predictor of poverty in
South Africa, it is unsurprising that the chronically poor group is
almost exclusively made up of black Africans. Coloreds,10 by con-
trast, seem to be more heavily concentrated amongst the transient
poor and the stable middle class, facing somewhat lower risks of
downward mobility. Although Africans constitute the largest propor-
tion of the middle class today – with a trend of growth in recent10 Colored is official South African terminology for an ethnic group of mixed racial
origin.”years, as illustrated in Fig. 4 – their share among the two top groups
remains far from demographically representative. That is, while Afri-
cans make up approximately 80 percent of the total population, in
2014/15 they made up just above 50 percent of the middle class.
On the other hand, while whites constitute a mere 10 percent of
the population, almost one in three members of the middle class
and two in three members of the elite are white.
As may be expected, Table 9 reveals a strong relationship
between the educational attainment of household heads and class
membership (similar patterns are observed when we look at indi-
vidual education levels). Heads of chronically poor households are
on average the least educated, with no more than five years of pri-
mary education, while the transient poor and the vulnerable tend
to have some secondary education. Household heads in the middle
class have generally completed secondary schooling, while those in
the elite likely have some tertiary education.
There is also a clear differentiation between classes in terms of
access to the labor market: The more disadvantaged the class that
a household belongs to, the more likely it is that the household
head is unemployed or economically inactive. Only 30.8 of house-Chronic Poor Transient Poor Vulnerable Middle Class Elite
Fig. 4. Racial composition of South Africa’s five social classes, 2008 and 2014/15.
Source: Authors’ calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified
weights).
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remainder being economically inactive or unemployed. Among the
transient poor and the vulnerable, approximately 50 percent are in
employment. By contrast, approximately 80 percent of the house-
hold heads in the middle class and the elite are economically
active, and the employment rate in these two classes is high at over
75 percent. Precarious forms of work including casual and tempo-
rary employment constitute the largest share of all jobs among the
poor and the vulnerable, whereas 80 percent of all household
heads among the middle class and the elite have a permanent work
contract (see Table 9).124.2. A dynamic perspective on the determinants of class membership
and inter-class transitions
In the following, we aim to further investigate the determinants
of class membership and inter-class transitions. For this purpose,
we use the point estimates of the poverty transition equation
reported in Table 3 above to examine how the predicted probabil-
ities of poverty entry and exit vary for persons with different com-
binations of characteristics. For illustrative purposes, we also
predict the average per capita expenditure based on household
characteristics for the respective person using a linear income
model (see Table B.3 Appendix). The results are summarized in
Table 10.
Our reference person, case (1), represents a ‘‘typical” member of
the middle class in South Africa. In line with the average class char-
acteristics reported in Tables 8 and 9 above, a typical middle class
household has two working adults and one child. The household
head is male, African, 46 years old, has completed secondary edu-
cation (12 years of schooling), is employed with a permanent con-
tract and union coverage, and resides in an urban area in Gauteng.
This reference person, if initially non-poor, faces a predicted prob-
ability of falling into poverty within two years’ time of 8 percent,
and if initially poor would have had a 37.8 percent chance of exit-
ing poverty. The predicted expenditure level for this middle-class
reference person is R2,959 per month, which is approximately
three times the basic-needs requirement captured by the poverty
line (R992). An even more stable job in the public sector would fur-
ther halve the risk of poverty (case (2)).
In the following, we first investigate how the predicted poverty
entry and exit probabilities and the expenditure level change, as
we gradually modify the reference person’s household characteris-
tics (case (1)) to represent a ‘‘typical”member of the vulnerable class
(case (7)).11 Compared to the middle class, household heads in the
vulnerable group are often somewhat younger and female, which
leads to a moderate decline in the predicted expenditure level (from
R2,959 to R2,495), but almost doubles the predicted likelihood of fall-
ing into poverty from 8 to 15.8 percent. Reducing the level of educa-
tion attained by the head to nine years of schooling (secondary
education not completed) leads to a further contraction of the pre-
dicted expenditure level to R1,812 and an increase in the propensity
to enter poverty to 24 percent, which pushes the person from being
middle class to the edge of entering the group of the vulnerable (note
that the probability cut-off value is fixed at a poverty entry rate of 25.9
percent). Vulnerable households aremoreover larger, normally count-
ing twoadults and two children, andoften there is only a single earner.
This is associated with an increase in the risk of slipping into poverty
to 36.1 percent, and a reduction in the probability of escaping poverty
once it has been entered to 22.6 percent (see Table 10).
Greater job insecurity also represents an important source of
vulnerability. A typical member of the vulnerable class living in a11 As discussed in Section 4.1, we observe striking similarities in the average
characteristics of the transient poor and the vulnerable.household where the head has a time-limited work contract and
no union coverage would face an average risk of poverty to 48.9
percent – confirming that the vulnerable group is often only one
income shock away from falling into poverty. Having fallen into
poverty, this stylized person would have an average probability
of exiting poverty of 16.3 percent, indicating a substantial degree
of poverty persistence that places the members of this stylized
household just at the edge of chronic poverty. If the head loses
her job and is forced to move into casual employment, the pre-
dicted risk of falling into poverty surges to 62.6 percent. Once in
poverty, the probability of escaping it is reduced to 13.4 percent
(see Table 10).
In line with the preceding simulations, we also investigate the
effects of modifying the middle-class reference person’s character-
istics to represent a ‘‘typical” member of the elite in South Africa.
Here we observe that, while higher levels of education and smaller
household sizes play a role, race remains key in explaining elite
status. Merely being white dramatically increases predicted per
capita household expenditure and decreases the probability of fall-
ing into poverty. Like middle-class households, a job loss in an elite
household head tends to correspond to a notable scaling down of
living standards. However, this generally implies a descent into
the middle class, leaving the household with a risk of falling into
poverty of less than 1 percent.
4.3. The distribution of risks and coping mechanisms across class
categories
This section aims to analyze in greater depth the routes by
which individuals and households move into and out of the middle
class. Building on the conceptual foundations laid out in the vul-
nerability literature – which, with few exceptions (see, for exam-
ple, Azomahou & Yitbarek, 2015), is mostly agriculture-oriented
and focuses on the occurrence of covariate weather-related shocks
(see, e.g., Carter & May, 2001; Dercon, 2006; Klasen & Povel, 2013;
Ward, 2016) – we attempt to identify shocks and insurance mech-
anisms with particular relevance to inter-class transitions and sta-
bility in the South African urban setting.
Our approach closely follows Jenkins’ (2011) version of a
method originally developed by Bane and Ellwood (1986) that
has been used repeatedly to study the determinants of poverty
transitions and low-income dynamics (see e.g. Jenkins and
Schulter, 2003). To our knowledge, ours is the first study that
applies this approach to provide an assessment of the events that
may trigger middle class entries and exists. The approach relies
on a simple correlation exercise, which links poverty transitions
– or in our case class transitions – to the occurrence of important
life-course events. While the analysis of these associations is
undoubtedly informative, we are aware that issues such as reverse
causation, confounding shocks and simultaneity impede any causal
interpretation. Our aim is thus to provide an initial idea of the
potential mechanisms at play, as well as an understanding of the
kinds of issues that will need to be taken up in further research.
For the correlation exercise presented in this section, we group
together the middle class and the elite on the one hand and the
poor and vulnerable on the other.12 All inter-class movements refer
to wave-to-wave transitions in the pooled panel dataset using the
first four waves of NIDS.
The tabulation of entries into the middle class or elite by event
type is shown in Table 11. In total, 7.3 percent of the individuals
who were classified as poor or vulnerable in 2008, 2010, or 2012,We include the elite here for completeness. However, it should be noted that of
those who escape from poverty or vulnerability, only 6.5 percent move above the elite
threshold. Similarly, of those who fall into poverty or vulnerability, only 5.9 percent
emerged from the elite.
Table 10
Predicted poverty probabilities for persons with different combinations of characteristics.
Predicted per
capita household
expenditure
Predicted
probability of
FALLING into
poverty
Predicted
probability of
EXITING poverty
Class
(1) A typical middle-class household has two working adults and one child. The
head of household is male, African, 46 years old, has completed secondary
education, is employed with a permanent work contract and union coverage,
and resides in an urban area in Gauteng.
2959 8.01% 37.82% Middle Class
(2) As (1), except household head employed in public sector 3474 3.78% 46.60% Middle Class
Gradually adjust the characteristics in (1) to represent a typical member of the
vulnerable group
(3) As (2), except household head is female and 42 years 2495 15.84% 34.91% Middle Class
(4) As (3), except household head did not complete secondary schooling 1812 24.04% 29.46% At the edge of
vulnerability
(5) As (4), except one additional child in the household 1570 28.65% 25.25% Vulnerable
(6) As (5), except only the household head is in employment 1366 36.13% 22.55% Vulnerable
(7) As (6), except no union coverage of the household head 1091 42.95% 19.62% At the edge of
transient
poverty
As in (7), but higher job insecurity
(8) As (7), except household head has a time-limited (i.e., non-permanent) work
contract
900 48.88% 16.27% At the edge of
chronic
poverty
(9) As (8), except household head is in casual employment 706 62.60% 13.35% Chronic Poor
Gradually adjust the characteristics in (1) to represent a typical member of the elite
(10) As (1), except household head is 48 years old 2995 7.48% 38.00% Middle Class
(11) As (10), except household head has tertiary education 4549 5.09% 57.22% Middle Class
(12) As (11), except household head is white 14,480 0.30% 93.55% Elite
Source: Authors’ own simulations based on coefficient estimates reported in Table 3.
Note: To be considered middle class, individuals must have a maximum predicted risk of falling into poverty of 25.89%. Transient poor have a chance of exiting poverty of
16.54% or above.
Table 11
Events associated with entries into the middle class (or elite), 2008 to 2014/15.
Entries into the middle class (or elite) from below Number of
cases
Weighted Share
(%)
Individuals who were poor or vulnerable to poverty in t  1: 57,571
Entries into middle class from below between t  1 and t: 2,850 7.26
Event prevalence Middle-class entries conditional
on event
Middle-class entries associated
with event
Household event type Number of
cases
Weighted Share
(%)
Number of
cases
Weighted Share
(%)
Weighted Share (%)
Labor market events
& Rise in the number of workers 17,268 31.69 1062 9.54 41.66
& Rise in the number of workers (household size
constant)
5993 12.05 487 14.51 24.07
& Rise in labor income (10%) (number of workers
constant)
5975 10.99 540 9.84 14.90
Non-labor income events
& Rise in income from public grants (10%) 4762 7.75 74 1.25 1.34
& Rise in income from remittances (10%) 286 0.57 11 6.42 0.50
Demographic events
& Change in the household head(from female to male) 7069 13.05 871 18.09 32.52
& Decrease in the household size 18,116 29.51 1265 9.27 37.71
& Movement from traditional to urban area 1736 2.49 248 15.42 5.30
& Movement to Gauteng or Western Cape from other
provinces
787 1.26 162 22.94 3.98
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights corrected for panel attrition).
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span. This small share is primarily explained by the fact that the
chronic poor, who constitute the largest share of the poor group,
had on average less than a 1 percent chance of moving up into
the middle class or the elite. Entries into the middle class or elite
were considerably more common among the transient poor and
the vulnerable.
We observe that more than every third entry into the middle
class or elite in our dataset can be associated with a rise in the
number of workers present in the household. On average, those
households which experienced this trigger event had an averagelikelihood of moving into the middle class or elite of 9.5 percent,
which is slightly higher than the unconditional average of 7.3 per-
cent. Some of these switches arose because a working adult joined
the household (or the individual moved to another household with
a larger number of working adults) and some arose because exist-
ing members found employment. The associated likelihood of
entering the middle class or elite is substantially higher in cases
where the increase in the number of workers occurs without an
accompanying change in the household size. While this conditional
event tends to occur less frequently, those households for which
we can assume that an existing member found a job have an
Table 12
Events associated with exits out of the middle class (or elite), 2008 to 2014/15.
Exits out of the middle class (or elite) into poverty or vulnerability Number of
cases
Weighted Share
(%)
Individuals who were middle class (or elite) in t  1: 7052
Exits out of the middle class (or elite) between t  1 and t: 1709 18.81
Event prevalence Middle-class exit conditional on
event
Middle-class exit associated with
event
Household event type Number of
cases
Weighted Share
(%)
Number of
cases
Weighted Share
(%)
Weighted Share (%)
Labor market events
& Fall in the number of workers 1648 21.25 577 30.17 34.09
& Fall in the number of workers (household size
constant)
767 9.46 251 31.35 15.77
& Fall in labor income (10%) (number of workers
constant)
1115 17.37 276 18.30 16.90
Non-labor income events
& Fall in income from public grants (10%) 80 0.36 43 34.21 0.66
& Death of a non-resident family member who assisted
financially
247 3.24 73 14.82 2.55
Demographic events
& Change in household head (from male to female) 1175 16.82 522 34.34 30.70
& Increase in the household size 1638 20.38 707 35.46 38.41
& Birth of a child (0 to 2 years) 994 11.98 472 40.96 26.10
& Death of a household member 306 3.82 93 22.72 4.61
& Death of a household member (with life insurance) 125 1.58 24 7.69 0.65
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights corrected for panel attrition).
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cent. In addition, increases in labor earnings (by at least 10 per-
cent), holding the number of workers in the household
unchanged, can be associated with an average likelihood of enter-
ing the middle class or elite of 9.8 percent. By contrast, those who
experience an increase in their non-labor incomes, particularly
government grants and remittances, will most likely not enter
the middle class or the elite. While these increases may play an
important role in buffering negative economic shocks and securing
the lives of the poor and the vulnerable, they generally do not pre-
sent an avenue into the middle class or the elite.
With regard to the household composition, decreases in house-
hold size and changes from a female to a male household head are
among the most frequently experienced events. Especially the lat-
ter tends to be associated with elevated chances of entering the
middle class or elite. We may note that there is some overlap
between those households that experience a change in the house-
hold head from a female to a male and those that experience an
increase in the number of workers. These would be cases in which
either an existing male member found employment and took over
the headship or a working male joined the household and became
the head. While geographic movement from traditional to urban
areas as well from other provinces of the country to Gauteng or
the Western Cape appear much less frequently than other trigger
events, those who move see their chances of entering the middle
class or elite increase considerably. One reason behind this pattern
may be that people decide to move because they find new or better
paying jobs in these areas.
Mirroring the analysis of the potential determinants of entries
into the middle class or elite, in Table 12 we report the correlations
between exits out of the middle class or elite and specified trigger
events. We observe that 30.2 percent of all exits out of the middle
class or elite are associated with a fall in the number of workers
present in the household. When the household size is held con-
stant, the associated risk is somewhat higher at 31.4 percent. By
contrast, cuts in labor earnings (by at least 10 percent), while hold-
ing the number of workers unchanged, do not seem to be a driving
force behind exits out of the middle class or elite. Similarly, we also
cannot relate the observed exits out of the middle class or elite to a
decline in non-labor income sources.In terms of demographic trigger events, changes from a male to
a female household headship can be associated with approxi-
mately every third exit out of the middle class or elite. This event
often coincides with the loss of an adult working household mem-
ber. Overall, 20.4 percent of all middle class or elite households
experienced an increase in household size and, of those who did,
more than every third household fell into poverty or vulnerability.
Despite the negative association between household size and risk
of poverty, the death of a household member can trigger a fall
out of the middle class, especially when the deceased household
member brought in income in the form of labor earnings. However,
life insurance can help to moderate this negative shock.
Finally, the association between the chances of staying in the
middle class or elite and the possession of selected insurance
mechanisms and credit instruments is reported in Table 13. Among
the formal insurance mechanisms, health and life insurance are
widely used and can be related to 42.8 and 45.5 percent of the
cases where individuals stayed in the middle class or elite, respec-
tively. Individuals in possession of a private pension, retirement
annuity, unit trusts, stocks and/or shares also have above average
chances of staying in the middle class or elite. Regarding ex post
consumption smoothing strategies, personal loans from banks are
the most frequently used instrument associated with a higher
chance of staying in the middle class or elite. However, access to
these financial services is limited to a relatively small, better-off
portion of the population. The higher financial stability observed
among this group may be a simple reflection of their rather ele-
vated economic standing and is not necessarily a direct outcome
of the possession of financial assets and insurance mechanisms.
In contrast, belonging to a Stokvel or savings club appears insuf-
ficient to buffer larger economic shocks and does not relate to a
higher likelihood of staying in the middle class or elite. Informal
loans from family members or friends also appear insufficient to
keep someone in the middle class or elite. These instruments, how-
ever, tend to be concentrated amongst the lower middle class and
may thus primarily reflect the already compromised economic
position of this group. Unfortunately, we did not observe sufficient
cases to provide an indication of the stabilizing effect that loans
from micro-lenders or from informal money lenders could have.
Asset sales, which may offer a potential coping strategy for
Table 13
Instruments associated with staying in the middle class (or elite), 2008 to 2014/15.
Staying in the middle class (or elite) Number of
cases
Weighted Share
(%)
Individuals who were middle class (or elite) in t  1: 7052
Continuance in the middle class (or elite) between t  1 and t: 5343 81.19
Event prevalence Middle-class persistence
conditional on event
Middle-class persistence associated
with event
Household event type Number of
cases
Weighted Share
(%)
Number of
cases
Weighted Share
(%)
Weighted Share (%)
Insurance mechanisms
& Have health insurance 2573 38.72 2196 89.72 42.78
& Have life insurance 3023 42.09 2496 87.79 45.52
& Have a pension/retirement annuity 572 9.59 493 91.93 10.86
& Have unit trusts, stocks and shares 160 2.77 154 97.79 3.34
& Belong to a Stokvel/ savings club 232 2.94 165 78.35 2.83
Credit instruments
& Personal loan from bank (in t and not in t  1) 520 7.72 441 89.04 8.46
& Loan from a family member/friend (in t and not
in t  1)
84 1.46 62 83.89 1.51
Source: Author’s calculations using NIDS waves 1 to 4 pooled sample (post-stratified weights corrected for panel attrition).
Notes: Insurance mechanisms are identified ex ante (in t  1), while credit instruments are identified ex post (in t).
102 S. Schotte et al. /World Development 110 (2018) 88–103households without access to financial markets, were also barely
observed in the data.
5. Conclusion
This paper has shown how existing empirical strategies used to
identify the middle class based on a vulnerability criterion can be
usefully extended and operationalized in the analysis of patterns
of structured inequality. We propose a multilayered schema of
social stratification that explicitly takes both the risk of falling into
poverty and the chances of (re-)escaping from poverty into consid-
eration. In this way, the proposed schema not only distinguishes
the stable middle from a non-poor but vulnerable group, but also
differentiates between transient and chronic poverty and allows
for the investigation of mobility patterns between these groups.
Our suggested approach thus not only extends the applicability
of the empirical methodology to the study of social stratification
and social mobility more broadly, but also bridges the gap between
the poverty dynamics literature and the middle-class literature in
economics, which, as we argue, should not be treated in isolation.
We believe the classification schema developed in this paper to
be relevant to any low- and middle-income country in which eco-
nomic progress is modest and/or intermittent, with the conse-
quence that those rising out of poverty may remain vulnerable to
falling back. While convenient in terms of cross-country compara-
bility, we purposefully refrain from the definition of absolute mon-
etary thresholds to identify class layers. We show that class
divisions based on monetary thresholds inadequately capture a
household’s chances of upward and downward mobility and would
lead to non-negligible misclassification errors. That is, by directly
basing our classification on the latent poverty propensity scores
from the regression design, we are better able to identify those
with an elevated risk of poverty than if we were to rely on mone-
tary measures alone. In consequence, any replication of the sug-
gested methodological approach will require at least two waves
of panel data to estimate poverty entry and exit risks based on
observed household characteristics. The scope for fruitful adoption
of this methodology will increase as such panel data becomes
increasingly available across the developing world.1313 Alternatively, following a very similar idea, Schotte (2017) recently suggested a
multidimensional approach to the definition of social class, which combines a
measure of absolute living standards with a measure of self-perceived chances of
social upward mobility. This approach has been applied to cross-sectional opinion
survey data.Our application of the conceptual framework to the South Afri-
can case illustrates the usefulness of the proposed approach. Based
on the social-stratification schema derived in this paper, we argue
that only 24 percent of all South Africans can be considered stably
middle class or elite. The middle class is thus considerably smaller
and its growth has been more sluggish than most existing studies
suggest – especially those that locate the middle class just above
the poverty line (compare Zizzamia et al., 2016). At the same time,
we find that the transient poor and the vulnerable, at 27 percent,
constitute a substantial share of the population. These two groups
straddle the poverty line – with their members frequently moving
in and out of poverty – and are similar in their observed character-
istics. In this regard, the perspective that our social-stratification
schema affords us is valuable in that it challenges the meaningful-
ness, in a dynamic sense, of the standard division of society into
poor and non-poor groups. The transient poor and vulnerable
groups nevertheless remain outnumbered by the chronic poor,
who – given the past decade’s slow economic growth – still consti-
tute the lion’s share of the South African population at close to 50
percent.
Having said this, it is important to note that in the proposed
framework, economic growth per se is no guarantee for the
emergence a stable middle class. For example, in a different coun-
try context marked by stronger poverty reduction driven by faster
growth at the bottom of the income distribution, applying this
framework may merely reveal a surge in the relative share of the
transient poor and the vulnerable without a concomitant increase
in the size of the middle class. Whether economic growth leads to
the expansion of the middle class, in return, will depend on its dis-
tributional nature, sustainability and employment intensity.14
From a policy perspective, we find that casual and precarious
forms of work do little to reduce poverty risks, while access to
stable labor market income is a key prerequisite for households
to achieve economic stability. In consequence, policymakers are
likely to face an important trade-off between flexible labor market
arrangements to foster job creation and the creation of fewer, but
better and more stable jobs that will allow more people to escape
poverty over the longer term. This is likely to be true not only in14 Unlike the situation when working with simple income or consumption
thresholds, we do not expect to observe substantial short-run changes in the
variables used to calculate estimated poverty risks (such as the distribution of
education levels, job types, or access to basic service). In consequence, when applying
the approach to a different country setting, survey waves should cover a period of five
or more years, as changes will need some time to materialize.
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over, in contexts marked by enduringly high socioeconomic
inequality – as observed in the South African case – policymakers
will also need to consider the large share of the population stuck in
chronic poverty with very low chances of being fruitfully inte-
grated into the labor market. In addition to the provision of basic
services that ensure that this group’s health, education and nutri-
tional needs are met, social transfers will remain an indispensable
source of income for many of the chronic poor.
Last but not least, our analysis indicates that the poor and the
vulnerable are not only more exposed to several risk factors, but
they also seem to be disproportionately deprived in terms of their
access to effective insurance mechanisms and coping strategies for
dealing with socioeconomic shocks. Noting the importance of
events triggering poverty descents and the inadequacy of existing
coping mechanisms opens up the possibility of improving the effi-
ciency of targeted social protection measures. However, for this to
be accomplished, policymakers will require a closer investigation
into how social stratification is related to the distribution, fre-
quency and intensity of poverty-triggering events on the one hand
and formal and informal coping strategies on the other.
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